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Encouraging children to think counterfactually enhances
blocking in a causal learning task
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According to a higher order reasoning account, inferential reasoning processes underpin the widely
observed cue competition effect of blocking in causal learning. The inference required for blocking
has been described as modus tollens (if p then q, not q therefore not p). Young children are known
to have difﬁculties with this type of inference, but research with adults suggests that this inference is
easier if participants think counterfactually. In this study, 100 children (51 ﬁve-year-olds and 49 six-
to seven-year-olds) were assigned to two types of pretraining groups. The counterfactual group observed
demonstrations of cues paired with outcomes and answered questions about what the outcome would
have been if the causal status of cues had been different, whereas the factual group answered factual
questions about the same demonstrations. Children then completed a causal learning task.
Counterfactual pretraining enhanced levels of blocking as well as modus tollens reasoning but only
for the younger children. These ﬁndings provide new evidence for an important role for inferential
reasoning in causal learning.
Keywords: Causal learning; Reasoning; Counterfactuals; Blocking.
There has been a wave of studies in the last decade
that have suggested that inferential reasoning
underpins some of the basic phenomena in causal
learning that have been traditionally explained by
associative theories of learning (De Houwer &
Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, &
Vandorpe, 2005; Mitchell, Killedar, & Lovibond,
2005; Vandorpe, De Houwer, & Beckers, 2005).
The ﬁndings of these studies have led some theor-
ists to claim that human causal learning recruits
higher order reasoning processes that operate over
propositional knowledge, are effortful, and place
demands on working memory (De Houwer,
2009; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).
One potential, and novel, source of evidence for
this type of account comes from research on chil-
dren’s causal learning. We have argued that,
within a developmental context, it may be possible
to characterize the reasoning processes necessary for
particular types of causal learning and then demon-
strate that children who, as yet, lack the ability to
reason in this way show deﬁcits in their causal
learning as predicted by a higher order reasoning
account (McCormack, Butterﬁll, Hoerl, & Burns,
2009; McCormack, Simms, McGourty, &
Beckers, in press; Simms, McCormack, &
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Beckers, 2012). The aim of the current study was to
add to this body of developmental evidence by
showing that a manipulation that alters the likeli-
hood of children reasoning in the necessary way
also impacts on their causal learning.
One phenomenon that has been the focus of
much of the relevant debate about the nature of
causal learning is blocking. Blocking is widely
observed in human and animal learning in many
contexts (Dickinson, 2001; Dickinson, Shanks, &
Evenden, 1984; Kamin, 1968; Shanks, 1985).
Demonstrations of blocking establish that being
shown a cue A that is paired with an outcome
(denoted as A+) seems to block new learning
that a cue B is causal, if B is presented only along
with A (in compound trials denoted as AB+).
When blocking is observed in human causal learn-
ing, lower causal ratings are given to B than to a
control cue C from a pair CD+ of which neither
element has been presented on its own. Blocking
has traditionally been explained by associative the-
ories by assuming that establishing an association
between A and the outcome results in the
outcome being already well predicted when the
compound cue AB+ is shown (Dickinson, 2001).
Traditional associative theories assume that new
learning only occurs when an outcome is surprising,
as captured by the Rescorla–Wagner rule (Rescorla
& Wagner, 1972); because the outcome is already
predicted through the presence of A, new learning
about B is blocked. Theories of causal learning have
often been assessed on their ability to explain
phenomena such as blocking and to account for
the factors that inﬂuence it (De Houwer &
Beckers, 2002; Dickinson, 2001; Shanks, 2007,
2010). Indeed, one of the chief sources of evidence
for the higher order reasoning account of causal
learning is a series of ﬁndings that show that block-
ing is affected by a number of factors that cannot
easily be explained by the associative approach
(De Houwer et al., 2005).
One factor that has attracted considerable atten-
tion is that of additivity (Beckers, De Houwer,
Pineño, & Miller, 2005; Beckers, Miller, De
Houwer, & Urushihara, 2006; Haselgrove, 2010;
Lovibond, Been, Mitchell, Bouton, & Frohardt,
2003; Mitchell, Lovibond, & Condoleon, 2005).
In studies manipulating additivity, participants are
shown in an initial pretraining phase two causally
efﬁcacious cues (i.e., each yields an outcome, e.g.,
A+ trials and B+ trials). They are then shown
either that if both causal cues occur together, the
outcome is stronger than when cues occur by them-
selves (additive pretraining; the stronger outcome is
denoted as ++ ) or that if both causal cues occur
together it results in an outcome of the same mag-
nitude as a single cue (nonadditive pretraining). A
considerable body of evidence now suggests that
blocking is strongly affected by this manipulation:
Blocking is robust following additive pretraining,
but weak or absent following nonadditive pretrain-
ing (Beckers et al., 2005; Lovibond et al., 2003;
Mitchell, Lovibond et al., 2005; Simms et al.,
2012).
Under additive pretraining conditions, partici-
pants can engage in a chain of reasoning that
leads to blocking: “A is causal and leads to
outcome +. If B was also causal, the outcome for
AB would be ++ . It is not, therefore B is not
causal.” As Mitchell, Lovibond et al. (2005) and
Beckers et al. (2005) point out, this reasoning
depends on making a modus tollens inference (if
p then q, not q therefore not p). This inference is
not possible under nonadditive pretraining con-
ditions, because the outcome will be of the same
magnitude regardless of whether or not B is
causal, and, according to the higher order reasoning
account, blocking is therefore either weak or non-
existent if outcomes are not additive. This
interpretation of Mitchell et al.’s ﬁndings, and
those of other studies that have manipulated addi-
tivity, is controversial. One important reason for
the controversy is that it has subsequently been
demonstrated by Beckers et al. (2006) that blocking
in rats can also be affected by additivity pretraining.
Indeed, on the basis of this ﬁnding, Beckers et al.
have claimed that rats are capable of inferential
reasoning, arguing that associative models tra-
ditionally used to describe animal learning cannot
account for the effect of additivity. Beckers et al.’s
ﬁndings, and their interpretation, have been
widely debated by comparative researchers (Castro
& Wasserman, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2009; Penn
& Povinelli, 2007; Shanks, 2010; Urcelay &
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Miller, 2010), and there have been some recent
attempts to explain their ﬁndings within the associ-
ative framework (Haselgrove, 2010; Schmajuk &
Larrauri, 2008) in order to resist the conclusion
that rats must have sophisticated cognitive
capacities.
The suggestion that the ability to make modus
tollens inferences is necessary for blocking is par-
ticularly interesting from a cognitive developmental
perspective, because it is well established that there
are developmental changes in the ability to make
this type of inference (Barrouillet, Grosset, &
Lecas, 2000; Braine & Rumain, 1983). Using a
child-friendly version of the well-known food
allergy task, Simms et al. (2012) showed that addi-
tivity pretraining affected blocking in children aged
6–7 years, and not in a younger group of 4-to 5-
year-olds. Moreover, they found a correlation
between modus tollens reasoning abilities and
levels of blocking, and they also showed that only
those children who were capable of making the rel-
evant modus tollens inference demonstrated block-
ing on their task. This study provided the ﬁrst
evidence that making modus tollens inferences
might be necessary for blocking under such circum-
stances. McCormack et al. (in press) replicated this
ﬁnding of a relationship between modus tollens
reasoning and blocking, and they also showed
that, in addition to reasoning abilities, children’s
working memory abilities independently contribu-
ted to blocking.
The current study followed up these ﬁndings.
As with any cross-sectional developmental correla-
tional data, it could be argued that demonstrating a
relationship between modus tollens reasoning abil-
ities and blocking does not establish that blocking is
causally related to, or a result of, such reasoning.
Stronger evidence that blocking is a result of infer-
ential reasoning would be in the form of a demon-
stration that intervening in and manipulating the
likelihood that children successfully engaged in
modus tollens reasoning also affected levels of
blocking. However, the challenge is to ﬁnd a
manipulation that might affect the likelihood that
children would successfully recruit such a reasoning
process. When Mitchell, Lovibond et al. (2005)
ﬁrst described the reasoning they believed
underpinned blocking, they described it as a coun-
terfactual inference (see also Beckers et al., 2005),
arguing that participants reason that if B had been
causal, there would have been a strong outcome;
there was not a strong outcome, therefore B is
not causal. Strictly speaking, the necessary con-
ditional inference need not necessarily be expressed
subjunctively using counterfactual premises—
participants can reach the correct conclusion if
they reason with factual premises as expressed indi-
catively (e.g., if B was causal, there was a strong
outcome . . . ). Nevertheless, intuitively, it seems
particularly plausible that participants will reach
the correct conclusion if, when asked about B’s
causal status, they start to think counterfactually
about what the outcome would have been if B
had been causal.
In fact, this suggestion is not just intuitively
plausible but can be justiﬁed on the basis of the
empirical literature on conditional reasoning.
While it is well known that even adults will
sometimes make errors when asked to make
modus tollens inferences (Manktelow, 2012),
expressing conditional inferences in counterfactual
rather than factual terms increases the likelihood
that adults will correctly make modus tollens
inferences (Byrne & Tasso, 1999). For example,
if adults are told that “If Linda had been in
Dublin, then Cathy would have been in
Galway”, they are more likely to conclude, when
told that Cathy had not been in Galway, that
Linda had not been in Dublin than if they are
given the factual premise “If Linda was in
Dublin, Cathy was in Galway”. Moreover,
Thompson and Byrne (2002) have shown that
if participants in a conditional reasoning task
interpret premises in counterfactual rather than
factual terms they are much more likely to make
modus tollens inferences. Byrne and colleagues
offer an interpretation of these ﬁndings in terms
of mental models theory (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991). However, it is possible to remain
agnostic about what theory of reasoning best
explains these ﬁnding (see also Beckers et al.,
2006) while exploiting it for our purpose of
manipulating the likelihood that children will
engage in modus tollens reasoning.
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In the current study, we varied whether children
were encouraged to think factually or counterfac-
tually about what they observed and then examined
whether this impacted on levels of blocking. Our
prediction was that encouraging children to think
counterfactually would facilitate modus tollens
reasoning, and thus blocking. We did this by
varying the type of pretraining that children
received before completing a causal learning task.
Children were introduced to our child-friendly
version of the food allergy task, in which children
observe a toy robot being fed plastic foodstuffs. In
this task, causally efﬁcacious foods cause the robot
to make a sound and his tummy to light up.
Effects can be shown to be additive by demonstrat-
ing that two causally efﬁcacious foods lead to a
more intense outcome—more of the robot’s
tummy lighting up and a louder, higher, sound
being produced. In the initial pretraining stage of
the current study, all children received additivity
pretraining—that is, they were shown that two cau-
sally efﬁcacious cues in combination yielded a more
intense outcome than when one causally efﬁcacious
cue was presented alone. Previously, Simms et al.
(2012) found that only older 6-to 7-year-old chil-
dren were affected by additivity pretraining, as
indexed by its effect on blocking in causal learning.
In the current study, we hoped to increase the like-
lihood that younger children of 5 years would use
the information they had received about the addi-
tivity of causes and display blocking by encouraging
them to think counterfactually about demon-
strations involving pairs of cues.
Children were assigned to one of two pretrain-
ing groups for the second stage of pretraining: a
factual pretraining group, in which children saw a
series of demonstrations and simply answered
factual questions about what had happened, or a
counterfactual pretraining group, in which children
saw the same demonstrations but were asked to
think counterfactually about what they had seen.
So, for example, during pretraining children were
shown that A was causal (i.e., shown A+ trials)
and that B was not causal (B– trials). They then
were shown AB+ trials. In the factual group, chil-
dren were asked what happens when A and B are
fed to the robot together (a factual question). In
the counterfactual group, children were asked to
imagine that B had been causal and were then
asked what the outcome would have been if that
had been the case. The correct answer in this
instance would have been to say that the strong
rather than the weak outcome would have occurred.
Following these pretraining stages, children
then completed a causal learning task using new
sets of cues, and levels of blocking were measured.
In addition to assessing blocking, we also gave
children tasks designed to measure the contrasting
cue competition effect of unovershadowing
(Dickinson, 2001; Vandorpe & De Houwer,
2005; although the term used to describe this
effect varies between studies). In unovershadowing,
participants see A– trials and are then shown AB+
trials. Under such circumstances, participants are
particularly likely to judge that B is causal, com-
pared to circumstances in which they see a pair of
cues CD+ , neither element of which is presented
on its own. Simms et al. (2012) argued that unover-
shadowing requires participants to engage in the
following chain of reasoning: “Either A or B
must be causal. A is not causal, so B must be
causal.” This is a disjunctive inference that children
ﬁnd simpler than modus tollens, and Simms et al.
showed that children were at ceiling in making
such disjunctive inferences. Given this, we did
not anticipate that the type of pretraining that chil-
dren were given (factual or counterfactual) would
have an impact on unovershadowing. Thus, our
core prediction was that counterfactual pretraining
would selectively increase levels of blocking. In
addition to the core causal learning task, children
were also asked separate sets of reasoning questions
designed to measure modus tollens and disjunctive
reasoning within the context of the main task. We
predicted that children would ﬁnd the disjunctive
reasoning questions easy, but that performance on
the modus tollens questions might be affected by
the nature of pretraining.
Method
Participants
One hundred children took part in the study: ﬁfty-
one 5-year-olds (mean age= 65 months, range=
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59 to 71 months) and forty-nine 6–7-year-olds
(mean age= 78 months, range= 72 to 83
months). These children were recruited and
tested individually in their schools. Testing took
place over two separate testing sessions, each
lasting around 25 minutes. Children from both
age groups were randomly assigned to either a
control (N= 49) or a counterfactual (N= 51) pre-
training group.
Apparatus and stimuli
The causal learning task involved a purpose-built
toy robot. The “tummy” of the robot had a trans-
parent Perspex centre, and along both the right
and left sides of the centre were two semiopaque
light boxes that contained battery-powered LED
lights. The bottom half of each light box was
pink, and the top half was red. There was a
hidden speaker inside the robot. There was a
movable platform in the robot’s mouth that toy
foodstuffs could be placed on. When the robot’s
nose was pressed, the platform moved downwards
into the robot’s tummy and tilted, dropping any
foodstuffs on it into the robot’s tummy. After this
one of three responses occurred: weak, strong, or
no response. A weak response consisted of the
bottom part of the robot’s tummy lighting up
along with a quiet, low noise. A strong response
consisted of all of the robot’s tummy lighting up,
along with a loud, high noise. These responses
lasted for 3 s, following which the experimenter
removed the foodstuff(s) from the robot’s tummy
through a hole at the back of the robot. The plat-
form returned to the start position (the robot’s
mouth) automatically. The robot’s responses were
controlled by an input ﬁle selected by the exper-
imenter from a computerized program on a
laptop. There were six sets of 5 foods for use in
the task itself, in addition to 16 foods used during
the pretraining phases, 8 foods used for modus
tollens and disjunctive reasoning testing, and 1
food item used to introduce the robot.
Procedure
The procedure consisted of three stages. In the ﬁrst
initial pretraining stage, the additivity of outcomes
was demonstrated to children using a set of food
cues that were not used in subsequent stages. In
the second pretraining stage, children were shown
further demonstrations involving pairs of cues and
answered either factual or counterfactual questions
concerning these cues, depending on which con-
dition they were assigned to. Again, food items
speciﬁc to this stage were used. The third phase
was the learning stage in which children observed
trials that they then answered test questions
about. In this stage, there were three blocking
and three unovershadowing tasks involving new
cues, with children answering the test questions
immediately after viewing the learning trials for
each task. Because the procedure was lengthy
(around 50 minutes in total), children completed
three of these tasks in one session and three in a
second session. Children received a mix of blocking
and unovershadowing tasks in each session; they
were randomly assigned to one of six different
groups that each received the tasks in a different
order. There was a reminder of the factual/counter-
factual pretraining at the start of the second session.
Both sessions occurred on the same day with a
break of at least an hour between sessions.
Initial pretraining stage. Participants were intro-
duced to the robot and were shown that pressing
the robot’s nose caused any foodstuffs placed on
the platform to drop into his tummy. The additivity
of outcomes was demonstrated using the series of
trials shown in Table 1a. Each demonstration was
repeated, and which foodstuff was used for each
cue (F–I) was varied between participants. When
a weak outcome occurred, the experimenter
described the robot’s responses as “a bit of his
tummy lighting up”, and when a strong outcome
occurred, the experimenter described this as “all
of his tummy lighting up”. In this part of pretrain-
ing, children were asked a series of comprehension
questions in order to ensure that they understood
the additivity of outcomes.
Factual and counterfactual pretraining. All chil-
dren experienced four additional pretraining scen-
arios. These are displayed in Table 1b. Children
were given two tasks where the outcome to the
compound was weak and two tasks where the
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outcome to the compound was strong. The order of
presentation of these scenarios was counterbalanced
between children.
Counterfactual pretraining group. Weak outcome.
After the child observed the two element and the
compound trials the experimenter stated: “We
know that food J makes part of the robot’s
tummy light up, and food K doesn’t make the
robot’s tummy light up. So when we put food J
and K into the robot’s tummy together only part
of the robot’s tummy lit up.” The experimenter
then introduced the counterfactual component of
the pretraining: “Now I want you to imagine some-
thing different. I want you to imagine that food K
was a food that makes part of the robot’s tummy
light up as well. Ok, so imagine that both food J
and food K were foods that make part of the
robot’s tummy light up by themselves. Ok, so are
you imagining that both J and food K were foods
that make part of the robot’s tummy light up by
themselves?” The child was then asked a counter-
factual question: “What would have happened
when we put both food J and food K in the
robot’s tummy together?” If the child answered
that all the robot’s tummy would have lit up, the
experimenter conﬁrmed verbally that they were
correct. In a small minority of cases the child
answered incorrectly that part of the robot’s
tummy would have lit up. When this occurred,
the experimenter reminded children about the
additivity of outcomes and then repeated the ques-
tion a single time. Children were given two of these
pretraining tasks.
Strong outcome. After the child observed the two
elements and the compound trials the experimenter
stated: “We know that both foods L and M make
part of the robot’s tummy light up on their own.
So when we put both food L and M into the
robot’s tummy together they made all of the
robot’s tummy light up.” Once again, the exper-
imenter introduced the counterfactual component
of the pretraining: “Now I want you to imagine
something different. I want you to imagine that
food L wasn’t a food that makes part of the
robot’s tummy light up. Ok, so imagine that food
L wasn’t a food that makes part of the robot’s
tummy light up by itself, and food M was a food
that makes part of the robot’s tummy light up by
itself . Ok, so are you imagining that L wasn’t a
food that makes part of the robot’s tummy light
up by itself, and food M was a food that makes
part of the robot’s tummy light up by itself?” The
experimenter then asked the counterfactual ques-
tion “What would have happened when we put
both food L and food M in together?” If the
child answered that part of the robot’s tummy
would have lit up, the experimenter conﬁrmed
verbally that they were correct. In a small minority
of cases, the child answered incorrectly that all of
the robot’s tummy would have lit up. If this
Table 1. Initial pretraining, factual/counterfactual pretraining, and learning phase
Stage Type of task Phase Cues
a. Initial pretraining F+ /G–/H+ /I–/FG+ /FH++
b. Factual/counterfactual pretraining Weak outcome J+ /K–/JK+
Strong outcome L+ /M+ /LM++
c. Learning stage Blocking Phase 1 A+ , E–
Phase 2 AB+ /CD+
Unovershadowing Phase 1 A–, E+
Phase 2 AB+ /CD+
Note: – indicates no outcome,+ indicates a weak outcome,++ indicates a strong outcome. C items were controls; E items were ﬁllers
and ensured that there was at least one demonstration in which the outcome did not occur per trial. Trials in both pretraining stages
were shown twice. Trials in each of the tasks of the learning stage were shown three times.
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occurred, the experimenter reminded children
about the additivity of outcomes and repeated the
question once. Children were given two of these
pretraining tasks.
Factual pretraining group. Children in the factual
group observed identical pretraining trials to those
for children in the counterfactual group, shown in
Table 1b. The pretraining procedure for this
group was identical up until the point at which chil-
dren were asked questions about the cues. Rather
than counterfactual questions, this group answered
factual questions.
Weak outcome. After the child had observed the
element and compound cues, the experimenter
stated: “We know that food J makes part of the
robot’s tummy light up, and food K doesn’t make
the robot’s tummy light up.” The experimenter
then asked the factual question: “What happens
when we put both food J and K into the robot’s
tummy together?” Children never answered these
questions incorrectly.
Strong outcome. After the child had observed the
element and the compound cues, the experimenter
stated: “We know that both foods L and M make
part of the robot’s tummy light up on their own.”
The experimenter then asked “What happens
when we put both food L and M into the robot’s
tummy together?” Children never answered these
questions incorrectly.
Learning stage. Learning trials immediately fol-
lowed the two pretraining stages and followed the
protocol in Table 1c. Unlike in tasks used with
adults, blocking and unovershadowing were
assessed on separate tasks to reduce the number
of learning trials that children had to view before
answering test questions. Children viewed the
learning trials for each task as shown in Table 1c
and then answered test questions. Note that for
each task, the compound phase includes a pair of
control cues, C and D. Neither of these cues was
paired with the outcome on its own; responses to
the experimental cue B were compared to responses
to the control cue C to provide a measure of
blocking or unovershadowing. Each participant
completed six tasks: three blocking and three uno-
vershadowing tasks. In each task, each trial shown
in Table 1c was given three times (including the
ﬁller trials E–), with the order of presentation of
trials within each phase varied. Thus, for each
task, participants observed 12 trials in total before
being asked test questions (i.e., 72 learning trials
altogether across the experiment), with the presen-
tation order of blocking and unovershadowing tasks
counterbalanced.
Each task used a new set of foodstuffs, and,
within each set, foodstuffs were counterbalanced
in terms of which element they represented (A–
D). Element E was a ﬁller item that was included
to ensure that there was at least one cue per block-
ing trial that was not paired with an outcome.
Test questions. Testing for each task followed
immediately after its learning phases. Once children
had observed all of the trials for any given task, the
following questions were asked: “Is (food name B,
e.g., cheese) a food that makes the robot’s tummy
light up?” and “Is (food name C, e.g., bread) a
food that makes the robot’s tummy light up?” The
order of the questions (B or C) was counterbalanced,
and children were required to give a yes or no
response. Children were also asked a forced-choice
question: “If you had to choose one of these foods
to make the robot’s tummy light up, which one
would you choose (experimenter holds out B and
C)?” Children could either name or point to one
of the foods (control or experimental). No feedback
was given to participants.
In the ﬁrst testing session, children completed
three cue competition tasks and two reasoning
questions (see below). In the second testing
session, they were given a brief reminder of the
additivity pretraining, and then factual or counter-
factual pretraining was refreshed by giving children
two tasks identical to those used in pretraining in
the ﬁrst session (one with a weak outcome and
one with a strong outcome). After this, children
completed the remaining three cue competition
tasks and answered the ﬁnal two reasoning
questions.
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Reasoning questions. All children also answered
two disjunctive and two modus tollens reasoning
questions related to the operation of the robot,
with new foods used for each question.
Modus tollens questions. Children initially observed
that a compound of two novel foods made part of
the robot’s tummy light up a single time. The
experimenter then stated: “Look, when we put
food N and O in the robot’s tummy together part
of the robot’s tummy lights up.” The experimenter
then asked: “Do both of the foods (hold up N and
O) or only one of the foods make the robot’s
tummy light up?” Answering this question requires
children to reason that if both foods are causal, the
whole of the robot’s tummy would light; it did not,
so both cannot be causal (a modus tollens
inference).
Disjunctive questions. Children initially observed
that a compound of two novel foods made part of
the robot’s tummy light up a single time. The
experimenter stated: “Look when we put food P
and Q in the robot’s tummy together part of the
robot’s tummy lights up.” The experimenter then
asked: “One of these foods (hold up P and Q)
doesn’t make the robot’s tummy light up. Does
the other food make the robot’s tummy light up?”
Answering this question involves reasoning that
because either P or Q must be causal, and one of
them is not causal, the other food must be causal
(a disjunctive inference).
Results
During the counterfactual/factual pretraining
session, children were asked four questions in
total. These questions were always correctly
answered in the factual group. In the counterfactual
group, if children gave the wrong answer they were
reminded about the additivity of outcomes and
asked the question a second time. To examine per-
formance on these counterfactual pretraining ques-
tions, we gave children a score of 2 points if they
answered a question correctly the ﬁrst time
(maximum score of 8) and 1 point if they answered
it correctly when it was repeated. Although we
anticipated that children might ﬁnd the counterfac-
tual questions difﬁcult, children scored on average 7
out of 8 (i.e., most questions were answered cor-
rectly ﬁrst time). There were no signiﬁcant
relationships between how accurate children were
on the counterfactual questions and subsequent
performance, and therefore no further analyses of
these data will be reported.
The presence of cue competition effects in chil-
dren’s causal learning was assessed in two ways:
through comparing numbers of “yes” responses to
experimental versus control cues, and by examining
how often children chose the experimental cue
versus the control cue when asked to choose a cue
to make the robot light up.
Choice scores
Children chose between the experimental cue and
the control cue three times for each task. Choice
scores were calculated as follows: Children were
given one point each time they chose the control
Figure 1. (a) Blocking choice scores as a function of pretraining and
age group; maximum score is 3 (+1 SE). (b) Unovershadowing
choice scores as a function of age and pretraining type; maximum
score is 3 (+1 SE).
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cue in blocking tasks, whereas in unovershadowing
tasks they were given one point each time they
chose the experimental cue. Figures 1a and 1b
show children’s scores as a function of age and pre-
training type. It can be seen from the ﬁgures that
pretraining seems to have selectively impacted on
the younger children’s blocking choice scores.
Initial analyses examined whether the levels of
blocking and overshadowing that were obtained
in each group were signiﬁcantly greater than that
expected by chance, using one-sample t tests (test
value= 1.5). Blocking was not signiﬁcant for
the 5-year-olds in the factual pretraining group,
t(24)= 0.30, p= .77, and unovershadowing was
only marginally signiﬁcant in this group, t(24)=
1.89, p= .07. However, signiﬁcant blocking,
t(24)= 5.79, p, .001, and unovershadowing,
t(24)= 2.72, p, .02, were observed for this age
group in the counterfactual pretraining group. For
the older 6-to 7-year-old group, signiﬁcant block-
ing and unovershadowing were observed in both
pretraining groups, all ts(23). 3.9, ps, .01.
Further analyses examined whether pretraining
had a signiﬁcant impact on choice scores. An
initial repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on choice scores, with a between-sub-
jects factor of type of pretraining (factual versus
counterfactual) and a within-subjects factor of
task (blocking versus overshadowing) found a
two-way interaction between task and pretraining,
F(1, 98)= 5.24, p, .03. Therefore, subsequent
analyses examined blocking and unovershadowing
separately.
Blocking. A two-way ANOVA on blocking choice
scores with between-subjects factors of age and pre-
training found a main effect of pretraining, F(1,
96)= 5.88, p, .02, and also a signiﬁcant inter-
action between age and pretraining, F(1, 96)=
4.08, p, .05. Further post hoc analyses showed
that the effect of pretraining was signiﬁcant for
the younger group only, t(49)= –3.19, p, .005,
with children in the counterfactual pretraining
group having higher blocking choice scores.
Moreover, the effect of age was signiﬁcant for the
factual pretraining group, t(47)= –2.40, p, .03,
but not for the counterfactual pretraining group,
t(49)= 0.29, p= .77.
Unovershadowing. A two-way ANOVA on unover-
shadowing choice scores with between-subjects
factors of age and pretraining found a main effect
of age, F(1, 96)= 8.06, p, .01, with older children
having higher choice scores, but no signiﬁcant
effect of pretraining and no signiﬁcant interaction
between age and pretraining, both Fs, 1.
Yes responses
Figure 2a shows the average number of “yes”
responses given to experimental and control cues
in the blocking task as a function of age group
and pretraining; these vary from 0–3 because chil-
dren received each task three times. Figure 2b
shows the average number of positive responses to
Figure 2. (a) Number of “yes” responses in blocking tasks to
experimental and control cues as a function of pretraining type and
age (+1 SE). (b) Number of “yes” responses in unovershadowing
tasks to experimental and control cues as a function of pretraining
and age group (+1 SE).
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experimental and control cues in the unoversha-
dowing task as a function of age group and
pretraining.
Blocking. A three-way ANOVA was conducted on
the number of responses to each cue type in the
blocking tasks, with a within-subjects factor of
cue type (control versus experimental) and
between-subjects factors of pretraining (factual
versus counterfactual) and age group (5-year-olds
versus 6- to 7-year-olds). The main effect of cue
type was signiﬁcant, F(1, 96)= 125.60,
p, .001, with fewer positive responses to exper-
imental than to control cues. This indicates that
blocking was at a signiﬁcant level for the sample
as a whole. The main effect of age group was
also signiﬁcant, F(1, 96)= 8.86, p, .01, with
older children giving fewer positive responses
than younger children. The main effect of pre-
training was also signiﬁcant, F(1, 96)= 4.13,
p, .05, with fewer positive responses following
counterfactual pretraining. There were no signiﬁ-
cant interactions. Our prediction had been that
counterfactual pretraining would increase block-
ing, manifested as a reduction in the number of
positive responses given to experimental cues.
Counterfactual pretraining did have an impact
on children’s responses, but its effect was to
reduce overall levels of positive responses to both
experimental and control cues.
Unovershadowing. A three-way ANOVA was con-
ducted on the number of responses to each cue type
in the unovershadowing tasks, with a within-sub-
jects factor of cue type (control versus experimental)
and between-subjects factors of pretraining (factual
versus counterfactual) and age group (5-year-olds
versus 6- to 7-year-olds). The main effect of cue
type was signiﬁcant, F(1, 96)= 34.35, p, .001,
indicating that unovershadowing was at a signiﬁ-
cant level for the sample as a whole. However,
there were no other signiﬁcant main effects and
no signiﬁcant interactions. Hence, levels of over-
shadowing were not affected by age or by
pretraining.
Performance on reasoning questions
The ﬁnal analyses focused on children’s reasoning
scores. These scores varied from 0–2. Children
were at ceiling on disjunctive reasoning questions,
with a mean score of 1.9. Figure 3 shows modus
tollens reasoning scores as a function of age and
pretraining. The graph shows that pretraining
enhanced modus tollens reasoning in the younger
group only. A two-way ANOVA on modus
tollens reasoning scores with between-subjects
factors of age and pretraining found a signiﬁcant
effect of age, F(1, 96)= 9.41, p, .005, a signiﬁ-
cant effect of pretraining, F(1, 96)= 6.17,
p, .02, and a signiﬁcant interaction between age
and pretraining, F(1, 96)= 5.96, p, .02. Post
hoc analysis showed that the effect of pretraining
was signiﬁcant for the younger group only,
t(49)= –2.98, p, .005. Moreover, the effect of
age was signiﬁcant for the factual pretraining
group, t(47)= –3.31, p, .005, but not signiﬁcant
for the counterfactual pretraining group,
t(49)=−0.55, p= .58. Further analyses examined
whether there was any relationship between chil-
dren’s performance on the modus tollens reasoning
questions and levels of blocking. Analysis using
Pearson’s correlations revealed a signiﬁcant corre-
lation between blocking choice scores and modus
tollens scores, r(100)= .278, p, .01, and more-
over that the partial correlation between blocking
choice scores and reasoning scores remained sig-
niﬁcant when controlling for chronological age,
r(100)= .243, p, .02.
Figure 3. Number of modus tollens questions correct as a function of
age and pretraining (+1 SE).
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Discussion
Our prediction—that encouraging children to think
counterfactually would enhance modus tollens
reasoning and blocking—was conﬁrmed for the 5-
year-old group in this study. Five-year-olds who
received counterfactual pretraining performed
better on the modus tollens questions than children
who received factual pretraining, and children of
this age performed at a level equivalent to 6- to 7-
year-olds on these reasoning questions following
counterfactual pretraining. Moreover, levels of
blocking, as measured by choice scores, were signiﬁ-
cantly higher in the 5-year-olds who received coun-
terfactual pretraining. Indeed, when 5-year-old
children received counterfactual pretraining they
showed blocking at a level equivalent to that of
older children, whereas there were age differences
in the absence of this pretraining. Counterfactual
pretraining did not affect the performance of the
older group either on the modus tollens reasoning
questions or on blocking, but this is likely to be
because this group was already performing well
even following factual pretraining.
Replicating Simms et al. (2012) and
McCormack et al. (in press), levels of blocking
were also correlated with modus tollens reasoning
abilities. These ﬁndings are the ﬁrst that we are
aware of that show that children who are encouraged
to think counterfactually will be more likely to suc-
cessfully make modus tollens inferences.
Moreover, this study is the ﬁrst with either children
or adults to establish that participants who are
trained to think counterfactually will show higher
levels of blocking. The ﬁndings strongly suggest
that reasoning abilities—speciﬁcally, the ability to
make modus tollens inferences—underpin the
blocking effect in this type of task. Thus, they
provide a new type of evidence for a higher order
reasoning account (De Houwer, 2009; De Houwer
et al., 2005) of this important cue competition effect.
Measures of blocking
The pretraining effect for the 5-year-olds was in
line with predictions for one measure of blocking:
the number of times participants chose a control
rather than experimental cue as one that would be
causally efﬁcacious. Beckers, Vandorpe, Debeys,
and De Houwer (2009) have previously argued
that because, unlike adults, children are not asked
to rate the causal efﬁcacy of cues on a scale, this
forced-choice measure provides the best assessment
of cue competition effects such as blocking in chil-
dren (but see Simms et al., 2012). However, block-
ing was also assessed by comparing the number of
“yes” responses to control cues versus experimental
cues given by participants when asked whether a
cue was causal. On this measure, pretraining chil-
dren to think counterfactually did have an impact
on responses, but in fact its impact was to reduce
the overall number of positive responses that par-
ticipants made, rather than selectively reducing
the number of positive responses to the experimen-
tal (noncausal) cue.
A straightforward explanation of this generalized
pretraining effect is possible, because modus tollens
reasoning could also affect the number of times that
children gave positive responses to the control cue
(Simms et al., 2012). This is because, for any given
control cue C, children will have seen that cue only
along with another cue D (i.e., the CD+ trials).
Children can reason that if both C and D were
causal, there would have been a strong outcome
and, using modus tollens reasoning, conclude that
only one of these cues can be causal. Thus, modus
tollens reasoning could potentially reduce the
number of positive responses to the control cue C
as well as to the experimental cue B—the pattern
observed in our data. Evidence for this suggestion
comes from the fact that there was a signiﬁcant nega-
tive correlation between modus tollens scores and the
number of times that children gave “yes” responses to
C cues (r= –.229, p, .03) as well as B cues
(r= –.418, p, .001) in blocking tasks.
Thus, the fact that counterfactual training
reduces the overall number of positive responses
to both control and experimental cues in the block-
ing task is entirely consistent with our argument
that counterfactual training enhances modus
tollens reasoning. Why, though, does counterfac-
tual training selectively increase the likelihood
that participants choose the control cue over the
experimental cue when forced to choose one as
causal? The answer to this question lies in the
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differential impact that modus tollens reasoning
should have on children’s beliefs that a cue cannot
be causal. Modus tollens reasoning will completely
disambiguate the status of the experimental cues in
blocking tasks, because it licenses the conclusion
that the experimental cue B cannot be causal
(since A is the causal cue). However, with regard
to the control cues, the same reasoning only licenses
the conclusion that C and D cannot both be causal
—it remains possible that C rather than D is in fact
the causal cue. The effect of this seems to be to
reduce the likelihood that C is judged as being
causal when children are asked to give a yes/no
answer, but to nevertheless allow children to con-
clude that C is more likely to be causal than B
when forced to choose between the two cues.
We note, though, that this account of the data
would suggest that the number of positive
responses to control cues should also be affected
by counterfactual pretraining in the unovershadow-
ing task, and this was not the case (see Figure 2b).
It is possible that, following counterfactual pre-
training, children may be more likely to engage in
modus tollens reasoning regarding control cues in
the blocking tasks because this type of reasoning
disambiguates the status of experimental cues in
those tasks. If children are thinking counterfac-
tually about outcomes regarding experimental
cues in the blocking task and then reasoning
using modus tollens, they may be likely to extend
this reasoning to control cues. By contrast, in the
unovershadowing task, children need only engage
in simpler disjunctive reasoning in order to disam-
biguate the status of the experimental cues, which
children of both ages found easy and which
would not be facilitated by counterfactual thinking.
Given this, they may have been less inclined to
think counterfactually about the outcomes paired
with the control cues in unovershadowing tasks,
explaining the lack of a pretraining effect on the
numbers of positive responses to these cues in the
unovershadowing task.
Why does counterfactual pretraining affect blocking?
The fact that pretraining did not affect perform-
ance on the unovershadowing task allows us to
rule out some simpler alternative explanations of
why the pretraining manipulation was effective. It
suggests that the effect of encouraging children to
think counterfactually was not simply to increase
the extent to which children engaged with the
task or remembered the trials. We interpret the
ﬁndings as indicating that counterfactual pretrain-
ing affects the likelihood that children reason
appropriately at test about the status of cues using
the additivity information about causes that they
had been shown in the ﬁrst stage of training.
However, it might be argued that the counterfac-
tual pretraining had a more direct effect on per-
formance by actually providing children with
more opportunity to learn that causes were additive.
In designing our task, we aimed to match the
amount of information that demonstrated additiv-
ity across the factual and counterfactual pretraining
groups. Nevertheless, we need to consider whether
the counterfactual pretraining condition did
provide children with additional information
about the additivity of causes. In the counterfactual
pretraining condition, children had to make judge-
ments about the combined effects of cue types that
had not actually been demonstrated to them (e.g.,
children in this condition had to imagine that the
causal status of a cue K, previously shown not to
be causal, had been different and then judge what
the result of feeding JK to the robot would have
been). Children were given verbal feedback on
their answers, and it could be argued that this
helped children realize that the additivity rule gen-
eralized to a broader range of cues than it did for
children in the factual group (e.g., applied not
just to a situation in which K was noncausal, as
had been demonstrated to both groups, but also
to a situation in which K was causal, which only
the counterfactual group imagined).
An important reason for doubting this interpret-
ation is that children’s performance on the counter-
factual questions indicated that they did not have
difﬁculties generalizing this rule. Children had to
use the additivity rule to answer the counterfactual
questions themselves correctly, and they did so for
the majority of these questions. This shows that
they were not conservative about using the additiv-
ity rule. It is true that on the minority of occasions
in which children in this group gave the incorrect
12 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2013, 00 (0)
MCCORMACK ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
09
.14
8.1
01
.19
4]
 at
 07
:36
 21
 Fe
br
ua
ry
 20
13
 
answer, they were explicitly reminded of the addi-
tivity rule (children were never reminded of the
rule in the factual training condition because they
always gave the correct answers). However, there
was no relationship between how often children
received this reminder and their subsequent per-
formance on the main task. Thus, we would inter-
pret the effect of the counterfactual training as
assisting children to effectively apply at test the
rule about the additivity of causes that they had pre-
viously learned in the ﬁrst stage of pretraining
rather than providing additional information
about the additivity of causes.
Our ﬁnding that counterfactual training affected
blocking has important implications for how the
effect of additivity pretraining itself on blocking is
interpreted in previous studies (Beckers et al.,
2005; Lovibond et al., 2003; Mitchell, Lovibond
et al., 2005). In particular, it seems difﬁcult to see
how the effect of encouraging children to think
counterfactually on blocking could be accounted
for within an associative explanation of additivity,
such as that of Haselgrove (2010). Hence, we
would argue that explaining additivity effects
remains an important challenge to any account of
blocking that does not appeal to a role for reasoning
processes in causal learning (Mitchell et al., 2009).
Reasoning and counterfactual thinking
How do our ﬁndings link with the broader litera-
ture on reasoning and its development? There are
three strands of empirical work on reasoning that
link with our study, although in each case there
are important differences between these bodies of
work and our methodology. First, there are some
studies that suggest that encouraging children to
think counterfactually has an impact on their
reasoning (e.g., Amsel, Trionﬁ, & Campbell,
2005; Dias & Harris, 1988, 1990; Leevers &
Harris, 2000). However, these speciﬁc studies
require children to reason syllogistically using
“false” premises (e.g., “Fish live in trees. Freddy is
a ﬁsh. Does Freddy the Fish live in a tree?”). The
ﬁndings from these studies indicate that getting
children to set aside their beliefs about the real
world and imagine that things were different
seems to facilitate accurate deductions. Typically
children in these studies are encouraged to think
counterfactually in the broad sense of being encour-
aged to make-believe or pretend that the world is
different (Dias & Harris, 1988, 1990), before
being asked to reason syllogistically.
Although, arguably, such studies also demon-
strate that counterfactual thinking impacts on chil-
dren’s reasoning, the methodology used in those
studies was very different to that used in the
present study, in which the premises that children
had to reason with were true but children were
asked to imagine alternative outcomes to those
they had observed. The second strand of research
that links to our ﬁndings, and indeed helped motiv-
ated our study, is that of Byrne and colleagues
(Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson & Byrne,
2002) who found that counterfactual thinking in
adults facilitated modus tollens reasoning.
However, our study differs from those of Byrne,
which involved varying whether premises in a con-
ditional reasoning task were expressed factually or
counterfactually and then asking participants expli-
citly to reason using the premises. In our study,
children were encouraged to think counterfactually
only in a pretraining phase, and this pretraining had
carry-over effects in terms of impacting on their
performance even on a task in which conditional
reasoning was not directly assessed. In this
respect, our pretraining manipulation has com-
monalities with a third set of studies that have
encouraged participants to adopt what has been
described as a “counterfactual mind-set” (Epstude
& Roese, 2008; Kray & Galinsky, 2003;
Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007;
Nestler & von Collani, 2008) in advance of com-
pleting another cognitive task. However, we note
that the effect of counterfactual pretraining that
we have demonstrated is considerably narrower
than effects demonstrated in counterfactual
priming studies, in which initially encouraging par-
ticipants to think counterfactually has an effect on
performance on completely unrelated reasoning
tasks.
The authors of such studies have argued that
adopting a counterfactual mind-set may encourage
participants to think more broadly and ﬂexibly
about evidence that they are presented with
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(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Markman et al., 2007) or
to consider more carefully the relationships
between stimuli (what Kray, Galinsky, & Wong,
2006, refer to as adopting a relational processing
style). Because the task affected by our counterfac-
tual pretraining involved making inferences con-
cerning the same type of content that children
had reasoned about during pretraining, we do not
interpret our ﬁndings as indicating a global
change in processing style. Nevertheless, the
success of our manipulation suggests that it would
be interesting to explore whether encouraging chil-
dren to think counterfactually has wider effects on
their performance on other cognitive tasks.
Counterfactual thinking and causal cognition
We conclude by considering how our ﬁndings
relate to long-standing questions about the nature
of the relationship between counterfactual and
causal cognition. The idea that counterfactual
thinking can lead to participants considering non-
actual possibilities, thus impacting on their causal
judgements, has been extensively discussed within
the literature on causal cognition (Harris,
German, & Mills, 1996; Hoerl, McCormack, &
Beck, 2011; Mandel, 2003; Spellman,
Kincannon, & Stose, 2005; Wells & Gavanski,
1989). This suggestion derives from philosophical
accounts of the nature of causation that tightly
link causal and counterfactual judgements (Hart
& Honoré, 1985; Mackie, 1974). Put simply, the
philosophical idea is that what it is to say that
event X caused event Y is to say that if X had not
happened, then Y would not have occurred.
Translated into a psychological principle, the
claim is that, when deciding whether an outcome
was caused by a particular event, one needs to
think counterfactually about whether the outcome
would have occurred in the absence of that event
(see Harris et al., 1996, for a developmental
version of this claim). If the outcome would not
have occurred without the event, then the event is
judged to be causal (what Spellman et al., 2005,
refer to as the “but for” test). Although we have
found that counterfactual thinking has an effect
on children’s causal judgements, it is important to
stress that the role of counterfactual thinking that
we are highlighting is not that implied by such an
approach (Hoerl et al., 2011). That is, when chil-
dren are assessing the status of experimental cues,
we are not assuming that they are using counterfac-
tual thinking to establish whether or not the
outcome would have occurred in the absence of
the cue (i.e., they are not applying the “but for”
test). Rather, on blocking tasks, counterfactual
thinking serves to highlight that, given the additive
relationship between cues and the outcome, which
can be captured in the form of a conditional rule, B
cannot be causal. Thus, although we are arguing
that counterfactual thinking can form part of the
process involved in making causal judgements in
this type of task, we are not interpreting our
results as evidence for a counterfactual theory of
causal judgement such as that described by Harris
et al. (1996). Rather, our results provide an interest-
ing addition to the literature on the relationship
between counterfactual and causal cognition,
because they suggest that counterfactual cognition
may make a quite speciﬁc type of contribution to
causal learning: by facilitating the extensively
studied phenomenon of blocking (for a more sub-
stantial discussion of this point, see McCormack,
Frosch, & Burns, 2011).
Unpacking the contribution that counterfactual
thinking makes to causal cognition is particularly
important from a developmental perspective,
because it can help characterize the nature of the
cognitive changes that are important for the devel-
opment of causal learning (Corrigan & Denton,
1996; Schlottmann, 2001; Simms et al., 2012;
Zimmerman, 2000). The key ﬁnding in this
context is that counterfactual pretraining abolished
age differences in levels of blocking, at least as
measured by choice scores. This ﬁnding suggests
that age differences in blocking reported previously
(McCormack et al., 2009; McCormack et al., in
press; Simms et al., 2012) may be at least in part
due to developmental improvements in reasoning
abilities, because when young children’s reasoning
was facilitated through counterfactual pretraining,
age effects were no longer signiﬁcant. More speciﬁ-
cally, they indicate that one potential source of
these improvements may be that older children
are more likely to spontaneously think
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counterfactually about evidence they are presented
with. Thus, our ﬁndings imply a novel way in
which the development of counterfactual thinking
could contribute to the development of causal
cognition.
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